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The DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile launcher in the military parade in Beijing in September 2020. DF-41 is currently in use in at least two brigades. Source: Ministry of National Defense of China.

Authors: Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, November 15, 2021

The DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile launcher in the military parade in Beijing in September 2020. DF-41 is currently in use in at least two brigades. Source: Ministry of National Defense of China.

The nuclear notebook was researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists and Matt Korda, the senior research assistant of the project. The nuclear notebook column has been published in the "Bulletin of Atomic Scientists" since 1987. This column examines China’s nuclear arsenal, and we have concluded that China’s nuclear arsenal has now surpassed France to become the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. We estimate that China’s inventory now includes approximately 350 combat warheads, and many more are in production. It is expected that the inventory will increase further in the next ten years, but it is still far smaller than the inventory of Russia or the United States. To view all previous nuclear notebook columns, click here.

China is continuing its nuclear weapons modernization program launched in the 1990s and 2000s, but is significantly expanding the program by developing and deploying more types and numbers of nuclear weapons than ever before. Since we released our last nuclear notebook on China in December 2020, the Federation of American Scientists and other agencies have revealed that China has begun to build hundreds of new ballistic missile silos across the country and has deployed at least two The brigade’s new DF-41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is believed to be capable of carrying multiple independently positionable reentry vehicles (MIRV) (Figure 1). China also continues to deploy more mobile DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and DF-26 dual-energy medium-range ballistic missiles, and is launching DF-17 medium-range ballistic missiles with hypersonic gliding vehicles. Capable. At sea, China has built two more ballistic missile submarines and is developing a new type of improved ballistic missile submarine. In addition, China recently reassigned its nuclear missions to its bombers and is developing an air-launched ballistic missile that may have nuclear capabilities.

We estimate that China has produced a stock of about 350 nuclear warheads for the delivery of about 280 combat land-based ballistic missiles, 72 sea-based ballistic missiles, and 20 nuclear gravity bombs assigned to bombers. More warheads are believed to be in production to eventually equip more road-mobile missiles and silo missiles, a new sea-based ballistic missile and bomber (see Table 1). This estimate is higher than the “low 200” warheads reported by the Pentagon in its 2020 report to Congress (US DoD 2020a); however, the Pentagon’s estimate only concerns “combat” nuclear warheads, and therefore may exclude allocations to be deployed The warhead of the new launcher.

The Pentagon’s 2021 report to Congress substantially increased its predictions of China’s nuclear weapons, claiming that China “may...have as many as 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027” and “have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030...” (U.S. Ministry of Defense 2021, viii). The forecast seems to rely mainly on China's construction of missile silos and assumptions about future plutonium production.

The amount and speed of stock growth will depend on China's stocks of plutonium, highly enriched uranium and tritium. The current inventory can easily support a doubling of the inventory, but an increase of three times—and of course four times—may require the production of additional materials. Currently, China’s ability to develop or acquire highly enriched uranium and tritium has almost no restrictions, but China may be restricted by its current plutonium stockpiles. According to reports, the production of military plutonium stopped in the mid-1980s, and there are no public reports that it has resumed (Zhang 2018). However, it is technically possible for China to use civilian reactors to obtain large stocks of plutonium, including the two CFR-600 fast breeder reactors currently under construction, which are scheduled to go online in 2023 and 2026 respectively (Von Hippel 2021; Jones 2021; Zhang 2021). In 2021, a book edited by the Non-Proliferation Education Policy Center estimated that through these methods, by 2030, China will have the potential to develop between 990 and 1,550 nuclear warheads; Co-authored by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation-Cautiously pointed out that there is no sign that “Beijing is bound to intend to transfer these large amounts of plutonium to weapons, but it can do so, and may choose to do so” (Ford and Countryman 2021 ).

However, in 2021 the Pentagon seems to rely at least in part on this study to predict how many nuclear weapons China intends to possess by 2030 (US Department of Defense 2021, 92).

U.S. estimates of China's nuclear weapons

The United States’ announcement in 2020 that China has more than 200 operational nuclear warheads is surprising because this number is lower than expected and far below the hundreds or even thousands of warheads claimed by some in recent years (Heinrichs 2020; Howe 2020; Schneider) 2019; Kappa 2011). Although lower estimates are different, they are usually correct, while higher estimates and significantly increased forecasts are incorrect. About ten years ago, when rumors about much higher estimates emerged, General Robert Keller, then commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, said: "I don’t think China has hundreds of more nuclear weapons than the intelligence community said. Thousands,... China’s arsenal is within the range of hundreds of nuclear warheads (Kristensen 2012).

Similarly, many previous predictions of China's nuclear weapons by the US intelligence community have never been realized. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. government agencies made multiple predictions on the number of Chinese nuclear warheads. A 1984 study by the US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that China had 150 to 360 nuclear warheads, and it was predicted that by 1994 it might increase to more than 800 (Kristensen 2006). That prediction did not materialize. Another 1999 study by the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that by 2020, China may possess more than 460 nuclear weapons (US Defense Intelligence Agency 1999). That prediction was not realized.

In 2019, the National Defense Intelligence Agency provided another estimate and prediction: "We estimate that the number of warheads in China is only a few hundred", and "in the next ten years, China's nuclear reserves will increase at least. Double” (Hudson Institute, 2019). The predictions made in the past are very different. Most are too high and too early. Figure 2 plots all these estimates and our own over time. Past exaggerated forecasts have emphasized why it is prudent to treat new forecasts with caution, but the discovery of three large missile silos has made the latest forecasts of the Defense Intelligence Agency more credible. According to a report by the Department of Defense, the inventory can be more than doubled without "producing new fissile materials", which clearly shows that China has not resumed the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (US Department of Defense 2020a, 87).

However, in early 2021, General Charles Richard, Commander of the US Strategic Command, went further than the Defense Intelligence Agency. In testimony before Congress in April 2021, he stated that China was “far ahead of the pace needed to double its nuclear reserves by the end of the decade” (Richard 2021a). A few months ago, in January 2021, Richard wrote in the proceedings of the U.S. Naval Research Institute that China’s inventories could "three or four times increase" in the next ten years (Richard 2021b). In November 2021, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress predicts that by 2027, China may have 700 deliverable warheads, and by 2030 there may be as many as 1,000 (US Department of Defense 2021, 90).

This increase will require the deployment of a large number of additional launchers, including missiles equipped with MIRV. The new forecast seems to assume that China plans to deploy a large number of MIRV missiles in the new missile silos currently under construction. But there are several unknown factors. First, how many new silos will be loaded? China may build more silos than missiles to create a "cannonball game" that makes it more difficult for opponents to target missiles. Secondly, how many missiles will be installed by MIRV and how many warheads will there be? Many unofficial sources attribute a very large number of warheads to MIRVed missiles (for example, each DF-41 has 10 warheads), but the actual number may be lower to maximize the missile’s range (each may be three to five , Maybe less). This is because we believe that the main purpose of the large-scale silo construction plan is to protect China's ability to retaliate against a sudden first strike. The main purpose of the MIRV program may be to ensure the penetration of the US missile defense system, not to maximize the warhead load of the Chinese missile force. As the United States strengthens its offensive power and missile defenses, China may further change its nuclear posture to ensure the credibility of its retaliatory strike force, including the deployment of hypersonic gliding vehicles.

Unsurprisingly, the projected increase has sparked widespread speculation about China’s nuclear intentions. In 2020, Trump administration officials stated that “China no longer intends to implement a minimum deterrence” but instead strives for “a form of check with the United States and Russia” (Billingslea 2020). These statements were responded to by the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Strategic Command in August 2021. He stated that “there will be an intersection where the number of threats raised by China will exceed the number of threats raised by Russia. "Achieved in the next few years" (Bussiere 2021). In fact, based on what we have observed in the large-scale silo construction plan, in the foreseeable future, China’s ICBM power seems likely to surpass Russia and the United States.

Even if China’s inventory has quadrupled, it still accounts for only a small part of the inventory in the United States and Russia. This fact led the Chinese government to reject it on the grounds that “it is unrealistic to expect China to join the two countries in negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear weapons” (Ministry of Defense of the People’s Republic of China 2020). However, Bussiere later clarified, “We will not look at it purely from a digital game perspective. This is what is actually deployed... The state of the troops, the situation of these deployed troops. Therefore, it is more than just an inventory quantity. "(Bussiere 2021).

The growth of China's nuclear reserves also depends on the size of its warhead. The nuclear weapons test program of the 1990s partially supported the development of the current warhead equipped with the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. The MIRV of the DF-5B liquid fuel, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile may use the same warhead. The large DF-41 may use the same warhead. The deployment of smaller warheads may require additional nuclear tests.

The U.S. Department of State’s 2020 compliance report assessed that some of China’s actions at the Lop Nur nuclear test site “caused concerns about China’s compliance with the U.S. “zero equivalent” standard. However, the report did not explicitly accuse China of conducting such tests, nor did the report clearly accuse China of conducting such tests. No evidence was provided. Instead, the report only pointed out that “the United States cannot rule out the possibility that China may conduct activities inconsistent with its moratorium on its proving ground” (U.S. State Department 2020, 50). Open source satellite image analysis subsequently showed that China appears to be Expand the Lop Nur test site, build about a dozen concrete buildings near the Lop Nur airport, and possibly build a new tunnel (Brumfiel 2021a) in the test site itself. Satellite images show what appears to be a new drainage area, roads, spoils, and Covered entrance (Brumfiel 2021b). If China does conduct low-yield nuclear tests in Lop Nur, it will violate its responsibilities under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which it has signed but not ratified. However, it is not clear whether such tests will give It brings military advantage.

Since the first nuclear test in 1964, China has always adhered to the principle of minimum deterrence. Historically, Chinese leaders have emphasized that credible second-strike capabilities are sufficient to prevent attacks on China and put most of their efforts on ensuring their survivability. Their nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the Chinese People's Liberation Army maintains a "low alert level" for its nuclear forces and stores most of its warheads in central storage facilities in the Qinling Mountains, but some are also stored in smaller regional storage facilities. 1

The Pentagon’s 2020 report reiterated that “China is almost certain to keep most of its nuclear forces in peacetime conditions—launchers, missiles, and warheads are separated.” But the report also described the PLA’s Rocket Force brigades on “combat readiness”. And the "High Alert Duty" exercise, which "obviously includes allocating a missile battalion to prepare for launch and rotation to a standby position, up to an unspecified time period per month" (US Department of Defense, 2021, p. 91). According to reports, some Chinese military officials advocate improving the readiness of China’s nuclear missiles (Kulacki 2016)

Enhanced combat readiness and vigilance exercises do not necessarily require the installation of nuclear warheads on the missile or proof that nuclear warheads have been installed during this period. The nuclear attack on China is unlikely to happen suddenly, and more likely to be carried out after a period of increasing tensions and conventional warfare, so that warheads can be matched at that time. In April 2019, the Chinese delegation attending the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons outlined its alert posture and the crisis of China’s nuclear forces:

The command of China's nuclear forces is highly concentrated. Army operations must be conducted in the strictest and most accurate manner in accordance with the orders of the Central Military Commission. In peacetime, nuclear forces maintain an appropriate state of alert. In accordance with the principle of coordination in peacetime and wartime, always ready, and ready to fight at any time, China has strengthened combat readiness guarantees to ensure effective response to war threats and emergencies. If the country faces a nuclear threat, it will increase its alert status and prepare for a nuclear counterattack in accordance with the order of the Central Military Commission to prevent the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If the country suffers a nuclear strike, it will resolutely counterattack the enemy (emphasis added) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2019).

The peacetime "moderate state of alert" may involve the deployment of a designated unit in a state of high combat readiness. The nuclear warheads are stored in a nearby storage location under the control of the Central Military Commission and can be quickly released to the unit if necessary.

Regardless of the state, the idea that a missile with a nuclear warhead is on alert is a core element of the Pentagon’s anticipation that China may adopt an "early-warning launch" posture in the future. In April 2021, the Commander of the US Strategic Command told Congress, “Although China maintains most of its forces in peacetime conditions, there is increasing evidence that China has transferred some of its nuclear forces to warning launches (LOW ) Status and adopt a limited "high alert" strategy" (US Department of Defense 2020a, 85; Richard 2021a, 7). As evidence, the Pentagon noted the construction of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos for solid-fuel missiles, while emphasizing the development of strategic early warning systems and modern command and control. In July 2021, State Council officials also pointed out that “Since 2017, the [People's Liberation Army] has also conducted exercises involving early warning launches, and now at least one satellite has been deployed in orbit to achieve the [LoW] attitude" (Joshi 2021b ).

However, these data points are not necessarily evidence of a shift to a more aggressive posture. For decades, China has been deploying silo-based DF-5 and road-mobile intercontinental missiles, and will prepare to launch them before they are destroyed in a crisis. Even with a large number of new islands and improved early warning systems, it is possible for China to maintain its current strategy. The combination of silo-type solid-fuel missiles and early warning can be seen as China’s response to the increasing risks it sees to the survivability of its retaliatory nuclear forces.

Both the United States and Russia have a large number of solid-fuel-based silo missiles and early warning systems to be able to detect nuclear attacks and launch missiles before they are destroyed. In addition, both countries insist that this posture is both necessary and stable. It is reasonable to assume that China will seek a similar gesture to protect its ability to retaliate.

China’s early warning system may also enable future missile defense systems to intercept incoming missiles. The Pentagon’s latest report states that China is developing a homegrown HQ-19 medium-range missile defense system that can engage medium-range ballistic missiles and possibly intercontinental ballistic missiles, although the latter will still take many years to develop (US National Defense) Part) Part 2020a, 75). China already has several large-scale ground-based phased array radars that contribute to its initial early warning capabilities. According to reports, China is also developing a space-based early warning capability, possibly with the help of Russia (US Department of Defense 2021, 93). Regardless of the purpose, if China develops an early warning system in the future, it is almost certain that it will misreport non-existent attacks sooner or later, and may trigger dangerous reactions-Russia and the US early warning systems have encountered this many times. Kind of emergency.

In addition, the long-term policy of the Chinese government is not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-weapon-free zones. In July 2019, the State Council Information Office of China reiterated this policy in a national defense white paper:

China has always adhered to its nuclear policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and will not unconditionally use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China stands for the ultimate complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China does not engage in a nuclear arms race with any country and maintains its nuclear capabilities at the lowest level required for national security. China pursues a nuclear self-defense strategy, and its goal is to maintain national strategic security by deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China (State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2019).

U.S. military officials have long distrusted China’s no-first use promise and have publicly tried to discredit it. For example, in February 2020, the commander of the US Strategic Command testified to Congress that he could “drive a truck with a policy of no first use”. However, he immediately went back and pointed out that his assessment was based on "few" insights into how China explained its no-first use policy (Richard 2020b). With the open-source disclosure of hundreds of new missile silos across China, Richard once again stated that “these capabilities challenge China’s stated'no first use' policy statement and implicit minimum deterrence strategy” (Richard 2021a, 7). Although there has been much discussion in China on increasing the size and readiness of nuclear arsenals and when to apply the no-first-use policy, there is no evidence that the Chinese government has deviated from these long-term policies (Santoro and Gromore 2020).

In the past, Chinese officials have privately stated that if China’s nuclear forces are attacked by conventional weapons, China may respond with nuclear weapons. If this view is reflected in the national strategy, it will contradict the promise of no first use. However, despite considering all these factors, the 2020 report of the U.S. Department of Defense guarantees: “There is no sign that national leaders are willing to add such nuances and warnings to China’s existing [no first use] policy” (U.S. Ministry of National Defense 2020a, 86). Some analysts believe that the threshold of China’s no-first use policy is much higher than what U.S. officials usually describe, and pointed out that China’s doctrine is very clear. Although the alert process can occur before the enemy’s nuclear strike, China’s nuclear strike is only It will happen after "the enemy carries out a nuclear attack on our country" (Kulacki 2020).

China is continuing to gradually modernize its land-based nuclear missile force. With the construction of more than 300 new silos at at least three missile silos sites and the construction of several new bases for road-mobile missile launchers, the pace and scope of this work seems to be increasing significantly. Overall, we estimate that the PLA Rocket Force has about 280 land-based missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. Of these, about 170 can hit certain areas of the United States (including Guam) with about 245 warheads. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can hit the continental United States is relatively small: about 110 missiles and about 185 warheads. The Pentagon predicts that by 2025, the number of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads capable of threatening the United States may increase to approximately 200 (U.S. Department of Defense 2020a, 55). Most of China's ballistic missiles—about 450—are medium-range and medium-range missiles for regional missions, and most of them are not nuclear missiles. We estimate that there are approximately 60 nuclear warheads allocated to these regional missiles.

In order to adapt to the growing missile force, the number of Chinese missile bases is also increasing. This increase is mainly due to the increasing inventory of conventional missiles, but it is also a product of nuclear modernization. According to a study, the number of ballistic missile brigades increased by more than 35% in just three years (Singer and Xiu 2020). Some of them are still under construction. In recent years, the unique work of Decker Eveleth (Eveleth 2020a) has greatly increased the transparency of Chinese missile forces. Based on this work and other information, we estimate that the Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Force currently has about 40 brigades equipped with ballistic or cruise missile launchers. About half of these brigades use nuclear-capable ballistic missile launchers, and this number may increase further as the bases currently under construction are completed (see Table 2 below). In comparison, Russia has about 50 nuclear brigades (called regiments in the Russian army) (Kristensen and Korda 2020a).

Perhaps the most important recent development of China's nuclear arsenal is the construction of nearly 300 missile silos in three regions in northern China. In the past few years, open source researchers have documented the modernization of missile silos and training areas in Sundian, Wuzhai, and Jilantai across China, but it is not clear how these silos work (Dill 2018; Kristensen 2019b) ; LaFoy and Ifles 2020). In February 2021, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out that there are inflatable gas domes covering the tops of multiple suspected silos at the Gilan Terrace, as well as half of the walls used to construct the silo walls. Circular wall structure (Christensen, 2021).

In June 2021, Decker Eveleth disclosed that there may be a construction site for 120 missile silos near Yumen, a city in northwestern Gansu Province, China (Warrick 2021; Lewis and Eveleth 2021) (see Figure 3 below). The missile field began construction in March 2020 and contains dozens of inflatable domes that are the same as those visible in the Gilan Terrace. Satellite images seem to confirm that the complex will contain missile silos, as the hatch fixtures became clearly visible after the air dome was removed. In July 2021, Matt Korda (Broad and Sanger 2021; Korda and Kristensen 2021) of the Federation of American Scientists disclosed another 110 possible construction sites for missile silos near Hami in eastern Xinjiang. The Hami silo site is in the early stages of development, as construction seems to have started in March 2021. The silos of the Yumen and Hami missile launch sites and the Jilantai training site are all located in a nearly perfect grid pattern, about three kilometers apart, with adjacent supporting facilities, covering an area of ​​about 800 square kilometers. These locations are located in China more than any other known intercontinental ballistic missile base, and are beyond the range of conventional and nuclear cruise missiles in the United States. On several different occasions, different departments of the US government seem to have confirmed that the construction site is an open source assessment of the missile silos complex (US Strategic Command 2021; Lendon and Gan 2021; Joshi 2021a).

In mid-August, the China Aerospace Research Institute, a research unit affiliated with the US Air Force, disclosed the existence of a potential third missile silo complex near Ordos or Hangjin Banner (Lee 2021a). The Ordos gas field began construction in April or May 2021. Unlike Yumen and Hami’s site layout and inflatable dome shape, it seems to include more than 80 construction sites so far, although it is likely to grow further.

Collectively, these findings indicate that China may be building about 300 new missile silos, which will be the most important expansion of China's nuclear arsenal in history. The number of new silos under construction in China will exceed the number of silos-based intercontinental ballistic missiles operated by Russia, and will exceed half the size of the entire US intercontinental ballistic missile force. If every construction site produces a new silo, if every new silo is filled with single-warhead missiles (DF-41 or DF-31A), then the number of warheads of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles may change from today’s Approximately 185 warheads increased to approximately 450 warheads in the future. If all new silos are equipped with new MIRVed DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, once all three silo sites are completed, the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile force can carry approximately 1,000 warheads (assuming three warheads per missile) . But it needs to be emphasized that it is not yet clear how China will operate the new silos, whether they are fully filled, and how many warheads each missile will carry. In any case, the number of isolated islands may have a major impact on the US plan to strike China.

Although China has deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles in silos since the early 1980s, the construction of missile silos of this size is a major change in China's nuclear policy. The decision to do so may not be caused by a single problem, but by a variety of factors, including protecting the ability to retaliate against the target of the first strike, overcoming the potential impact of hostile missile defense systems; better balancing movement Intercontinental ballistic missile force between missiles and silo missiles; improve China’s nuclear war readiness and overall nuclear strike capabilities to improve the nuclear arsenals of Russia, India, and the United States; enhance national prestige.

In addition, the focus on silo missiles may be related to China’s long-term transition from old-fashioned, transportable, liquid-fueled, slow-launched missiles to long-range, solid-fuel, faster-launched missiles. China's last liquid fuel mobile intercontinental ballistic missile-the DF-4 (CSS-3)-has been reduced to a brigade and may be decommissioned. China has about 20 liquid-fuel, silo-based DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile forces continuing to upgrade, but their long refueling process makes them vulnerable to attack. Two versions are currently deployed-DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) and MIRVed DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3)-the third version is called DF-5C and seems to be under development. The latest report submitted by the Pentagon to Congress states that the DF-5B can carry up to 5 MIRVs (U.S. Department of Defense 2020a, 56), 2 more than we previously assumed. We estimate that half of the DF-5 are currently equipped with MIRV, although China may plan to equip them with MIRV before the new DF-41 may take over this role in the future.

China first used DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2006. It is a three-stage road mobile missile, transported in a 15-meter tank by a six-axle transport vehicle erected launcher. The DF-31 has a range of approximately 7,200 kilometers (km), but it cannot reach the United States from its deployment area in China. 2 Presumably, it has taken over most of the regional targets (Russia, India, and Guam) to be completed by the DF-4 that is about to be decommissioned. Currently, China has only deployed one DF-31 brigade, and less than 10 launchers may soon be upgraded to the new DF-31AG.

DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) is an extended-range version of DF-31, but has obviously the same transmitter. The DF-31A has a range of 11,200 kilometers and is capable of covering about half of the continental United States, depending on the launch area. Each DF-31A brigade used to operate only 6 transmitters, but recently some have been upgraded to 12 (Eveleth 2020b). The National Aerospace Intelligence Center estimates that the number of DF-31A launchers exceeds 15; however, considering the number of bases observed by the launchers, we estimate that China has deployed approximately 36 DF-31A (National Aerospace Information Center 2020, 29). The DF-31A brigade is being upgraded to DF-31AG.

Since 2017, China's road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile modernization has focused on replacing DF-31s and DF-31A capabilities with DF-31AG. After its first display in 2017, the latest report from the National Aeronautics and Space Intelligence Center listed DF-31AG as "UNK" [unknown], indicating the number of warheads per missile. In contrast, DF-31A lists a warhead, which indicates that the AG version may have a different payload (National Aerospace Intelligence Center 2020, 29). A 2018 report from the Department of Defense described the DF-31AG as "an enhanced version of the DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missile, which also uses transport aircraft to erect launchers to improve its mobility and survivability" (US Department of Defense 2018a, 76). In September 2021, a report stated that personnel of the 612 brigade of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Force equipped with DF-21 in southeastern China are using DF-31AG for training, indicating that the force may be upgrading (Lee 2021b).

The next stage of China's ICBM modernization is to integrate the long-awaited DF-41 ICBM (CSS-20), which has reportedly been developed since at least 1997. Eighteen DF-41s were mobilized to participate in China's 70th National Day military parade in October 2019; 16 of them are said to be on display from two brigades (New China Television 2019). In April 2021, the Commander of the US Strategic Command testified to Congress that DF-41 “began to be put into use last year and China has formed at least two brigades” (Richard 2021a, 7). This is consistent with the assessment of the National Aerospace Intelligence Center, which estimates that China has at least 16 launchers for the DF-41 system (National Aerospace Intelligence Center 2020, 29). The U.S. Department of Defense believes that this type of missile can carry multiple air missiles, and there are rumors in the media that the DF-41 can carry 6 to 10 warheads (U.S. Department of Defense, p. 45, 2019; Goetz, 2016). Such rumors are often exaggerated. The number of warheads that the DF-41 can carry may be much less. In order to maximize the range, it may be three. Nor should it be assumed that all DF-41s must be equipped with MIRV. DF-41 is expected to eventually replace the aging DF-5, in addition to erecting launchers for mobile transport vehicles, it may also be launched from silos and rail cars (US Department of Defense, 2019, 45). According to the US Department of Defense, DF-41 is likely to eventually be deployed in some or all of China's new silo fields in Yumen, Hami, and Ordos (Gertz 2021).

Land-based medium-range and medium-range ballistic missiles

For many years, the DF-21 missile family has constituted China's main regional nuclear capability system. DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) is a two-stage solid-fuel road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile with a range of about 2,150 kilometers (unclassified range of 1,750 kilometers). Since 2016, China has been deploying a new version of CSS-5 Mod 6, which may be called DF-21E. The new Mod name indicates that it carries enhanced missiles. We estimate that China has about 40 transmitters for nuclear DF-21A/E. China has also deployed two conventional versions: DF-21C (CSS-4 Mod 4) ground attack missile and DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) anti-ship missile. Early indications indicate that the DF-21D can be launched from the ground or integrated into China's H-6 N bomber.

In the past four years, Dongfeng 21’s dominant position in China’s regional nuclear power has been largely replaced by Dongfeng 26 (CSS-18) medium-range ballistic missiles. In 2016, the dual-function DF-26 six-axis road mobile launcher was displayed at the military parade. The first brigade stood up outside Xinyang City, Henan Province in April 2018 (Ministry of National Defense People’s Republic of China 2018). The Pentagon stated in its annual report that in the past three years, the DF-26 force has increased from 16 launchers in 2018 to 30, and to 80 launchers in 2019 (this may be the upper limit of the range estimate of 55 to 80), will increase to 200 launchers by 2020, equipped with "more than 200 missiles" (US Department of Defense 2020a, 59). In contrast, a recent briefing by the US Indo-Pacific Command listed 100 DF-26 transmitters (Kristensen 2020a). Larger DOD numbers may include transmitters in production. So far, the number of people deployed will almost certainly increase to more than 100.

Most dual-function DF-26s are used for regular missions, including anti-ship variants, and may not have nuclear warheads assigned. China claims to have successfully tested anti-ship versions of DF-21 and DF-26 missiles (Trevithick 2020; Huang 2020a) against target ships in August 2020. A few DF-26 transmitters, maybe 20, may play a regional nuclear role together with DF-21. We estimate that four or five DF-26 brigades have been put into use, and several brigades are under formation (see Table 2).

Like the existing DF-4 and DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the 4,000-kilometer DF-26 can target important US military bases in Guam. According to reports, DF-26 was operating in a new training area in Inner Mongolia in January 2019 and has been seen in several other brigades (Kristensen 2019a; Kristensen 2020b). However, unlike DF-4 and DF-31, DF-26 has dual capabilities and is more precise, so it is possible to provide China with its first precision nuclear strike capability, although it should be emphasized that accuracy is mainly conventional Require. The Pentagon's 2020 report pointed out that there is also an anti-ship variant of DF-26 (U.S. Department of Defense 2020a, 73).

The dual function of DF-26 (and DF-21) raises some difficult questions about command and control, as well as the possibility of misunderstandings in crises. The preparations for launching (or actually launching) DF-26 with conventional warheads against US bases in the region may be misunderstood as launching nuclear weapons and triggering nuclear escalation (or even preemptive strikes). China, India, and Pakistan have implemented a mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities on medium-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. The U.S. Department of Defense cited 2017 Chinese defense industry publications and also assumed that DF-26 may eventually be used to deploy low-yield warheads (U.S. Department of Defense 2020a, 88), although it did not provide evidence that China plans to do so.

Finally, at the 70th National Day military parade held in October 2019, China's Dongfeng 17 (CSS-22) hypersonic boosted gliding missile made its debut. The official announcer showed and introduced sixteen launchers, which play a regular role in the mission of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (New China TV 2019). However, unofficial sources related to China’s defense industry claimed that the missile would have dual capabilities (Huang 2019), and in the testimony of the Senate, the Commander of the US Strategic Command listed DF-17 as a “strategic nuclear system” (Richard 2020a). , 4). It is believed that DF-17 is currently being integrated into several brigades. At the end of 2020, the South China Morning Post reported that China had deployed at least one DF-17 brigade to southeastern China; however, this has not been confirmed (Chan 2020a). China's national television images in December 2020 also seem to show the erection of the launcher (Lee 2020b) of the DF-17 transport aircraft of the 627 brigade of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Force in Jieyang.

Despite many unconfirmed Internet rumors, we estimate that all China's short-range ballistic missiles are conventional missiles, with one possible exception: DF-15 (CSS-6). According to reports, China’s nuclear test conducted on August 16, 1990 may be “related to the development of Chinese short-range ballistic missile warheads” (CIA 1990, 1). Three years later, the CIA concluded that “China will start deploying nuclear weapons next year. CSS-X-6.” The 1993 memo continued: “China almost certainly has developed a warhead for this system. Formal weaponization or other warhead options may require testing” (CIA 1993, 5). Although China had developed a significant nuclear capability at the time, it is not clear whether it had completed and deployed a nuclear warhead for the DF-15. The 2020 report submitted by the Department of Defense to Congress listed the DF-15 as a conventional missile (US Department of Defense 2020a, 55). If so, China may have developed this capability, but never deployed it. Chinese official media seems to indicate that the DF-15 was used in two missile tests conducted in August 2021; however, the observed flight path was approximately 1,400 kilometers—almost twice the 800 kilometers estimated by Dongfeng 15 (China Aerospace Research Institute 2021). This may indicate that the U.S. government’s previous assessment of the DF-15 range is incorrect, or that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s rocket unit confuses the launch of different types of missiles by displaying images of the DF-15.

Submarine and sea-based ballistic missile

China has launched six Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Their base is located at the Longpo Mountain Naval Base near Yulin, Hainan Island. The two latest SSBNs were handed over to the People’s Liberation Army Navy in April 2020 and are believed to be variants of the original Type 094 design, known as Type 094A. One of the new SSBN ships, Long March 18, entered service on the 72nd anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy in April 2021, indicating that at least five ships are now in service (Chan 2021). If the sixth ship has not happened yet, it may be put into service soon. Type 094A submarines have a more prominent hump, which initially sparked some questions about whether they can carry up to 16 JL-2 (CSS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) instead of the usual 12 (Sutton) Guess. 2016; Suqiu 2020). However, satellite images confirm that each of the new submarines is equipped with 12 launch tubes (Kristensen and Korda 2020b).

Each JL-2 is equipped with a warhead and possibly penetration equipment. The JL-2 is an improved version of the DF-31 and is believed to have a range of approximately 7,200 kilometers, although the range estimates in the United States have been different over the years. Such a range is sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia and India from the waters near China, but unless the missile-carrying submarine penetrates deep into the Pacific Ocean, it cannot target the continental United States.

Although the promotion is more advanced than China’s first experimental SSBN-a single and currently unusable Xia (Type 092)-it is still a very noisy design; people suspect that the Type 094 is still two louder than the top Russian or American SSBNs Orders of magnitude (Coates 2016). For this reason, China will face restrictions and challenges when using its SSBN forces in conflicts (Kristensen 2009a). Therefore, it seems likely that China will cease production after the completion of the six ships it has now completed, and instead focus on the development of the quieter third-generation (Type 096) SSBN, which is scheduled to begin construction in the early 2020s. The completion of a new building hall in Huludao, where the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine is built, indicates that construction of the Type 096 may soon begin, and it is expected to be larger and heavier than Type 094 (Sutton 2020). In February 2021, the stern of a new submarine can be seen through commercial satellite images-possibly the stern of the first Type 096 submarine, indicating that China may have begun to build the first new SSBN (Sutton 2021).

Given that China's SSBN is assumed to have a service life of approximately 40 years, the US Department of Defense predicts that Type 094 and Type 096 submarines will operate simultaneously (US Department of Defense 2020a, 86). If so, this may result in a fleet of 8 to 10 SSBNs in the future.

It is not yet certain whether the submarine has carried nuclear weapons on board for deterrence patrols. The U.S. Secretary of Naval Operations Lieutenant General Joseph Mulloy stated in early 2015 that a Chinese SSBN patrolled for 95 days (Osborne 2015). At the end of 2015, General Cecil Haney, the commander of the US Strategic Command, stated that China’s SSBNs have been at sea. Although he did not know whether there were nuclear weapons on board, he had to assume that they did (Gertz 2015). In early 2016, the Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Chinese Navy “deployed Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in 2015” during extended patrols away from Chinese waters (Stewart 2016, 12). In addition, satellite photos of the SSBN base on Hainan Island show that several submarines—sometimes four—are missing. Although this does not prove that they are patrolling (one or two may be hidden in the base's undersea tunnel) or carrying nuclear weapons, it does show that the fleet is active. Despite these uncertainties, Western military officials privately stated that the United States, Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom "are already trying to track the movements of Chinese missile submarines as if they were fully armed and conducting deterrent patrols" (Torrod and Rager) 2019).

In order to fully develop a viable sea-based nuclear deterrent force, China's SSBN fleet will face several principles, technologies, and operational constraints. Although the Chinese missile forces often practice the procedures required to load warheads on missiles, the Central Military Commission of China has long refused to distribute nuclear warheads to armed forces for deployment on missiles under normal circumstances. The custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a major change in Chinese policy. In addition, prior to this, the Central Military Commission and the Chinese Navy must first accumulate experience in operating SSBN forces in actual military operations, which requires the development of reliable command and control technologies and procedures.

SSBN also needs a transmission destination. Even if China deploys nuclear-armed SSBNs at sea during the crisis, where will they head? In order for the JL-2 to hit targets in the continental United States, the promotion to SSBN must sail through the East China Sea and into the Pacific, passing through dangerous throat points, where it can be spotted and threatened. Hostile anti-submarine warfare. During the conflict, China is more likely to place its SSBN in a protected "fortress" in the South China Sea. Whenever Chinese SSBNs go to sea in the area, they usually appear to be equipped with protective details, including surface ships and aircraft (and possibly attack submarines) that can track hostile submarines (Torode and Lague 2019).

China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will carry an extended-range SLBM, namely JL-3. The National Aerospace Intelligence Center estimates that its range is more than 10,000 kilometers (National Aerospace Intelligence Center (2020, 33)). Although this range allows submarines to travel from China The waters are aimed at the northwestern part of the continental United States, but it still cannot target Washington, DC without passing through northeastern Japan. Chinese media sources described JL-3 as "equivalent to or similar to the French M51" SLBM, noting that it has an increased diameter compared to JL-2 and includes a carbon fiber shell, which will allow for extended range (Coates 2020). In its latest ballistic and cruise missile threat report, the National Aerospace Intelligence Center stated that the JL-3 will be able to launch "multiple" warheads per missile (National Aerospace Intelligence Center 2020, 33).

According to reports, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted the first test of JL-3 in November 2018 (Gertz 2018), and it seems to have conducted at least two additional tests since then. The first round of the JL-3 test was conducted using the 032 auxiliary test submarine; however, it is rumored that the latest missile test was conducted in December 2019, and it was rumored to be conducted on the 094 SSBN (Chan 2020b). But if the new Type 096 SSBN is larger than the Jin class, and the JL-3 has a significantly greater range, then whether the Jin class is capable of launching the JL-3 seems to be questionable. These tests, as well as the recent JL-3 design team’s nomination for the “National Innovation Excellence Award”, indicate that the missile is currently in the late stages of development and is expected to compete with the new 096 SSBN in 2025 (Liu 2020; Huang 2020b). Some private sources speculate that the Type 096 will carry 24 missiles (Chan 2020b), but no official information confirms this. Based on current and projected missile inventory, it seems more likely to carry 12 to 16 missiles.

China developed various types of nuclear bombs between 1965 and 1979, and used aircraft to transport at least 12 nuclear weapons that were detonated in its nuclear test program. However, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s nuclear mission was still officially dormant in the 2000s, probably because its old bomb-equipped aircraft were unlikely to be used in the event of a nuclear conflict. Even as recently as 2017, the US Department of Defense assessed that “the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force currently has no nuclear missions” (US Department of Defense 2017, 61).

Of course, this did not prevent the PLA Air Force from maintaining the remaining capacity to carry nuclear weapons from bombers. The so-called strategic and tactical nuclear bombs (globalsecurity.org) of various shapes are displayed in various military museums in China. 2020; Test Ban Treaty 2020). A 1984 briefing by the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that China had about 165 nuclear bombs used in aircraft, although the agency also stated that “we cannot determine the relevant airport storage location” (US Defense Intelligence Agency 1984, 3-4). By the early 1990s, the agency had reduced its estimate to 75 bombs, but stated that H-6 (Tu-16) and H-5 (Tu-28) medium-range bombers and A-5 fighter-bombers were "both capable of transporting nuclear weapons." (United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 1991, 3). The National Security Council of the United States notified Congress in 1993: "The main task of no unit of the Chinese Air Force is to transport a small number of nuclear bombs from China. On the contrary, some units may undertake nuclear delivery tasks as emergency tasks" (National Security Council 1993, 2).

While re-emphasizing the modernization of nuclear aircraft, the U.S. Department of Defense reported in 2018 that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force was “re-assigned to nuclear missions” and that “H-6 and future stealth bombers may be nuclear bombers.” Capabilities” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018a, 75, 34). The 2019 report cited unidentified “Chinese media” sources that apparently marked the upgraded H-6 K as “dual-core conventional” since 2016. Bombers" (U.S. Department of Defense 2019, 41). The U.S. Department of Defense’s Handbook on Nuclear Issues in February 2020 lists H-6 as a nuclear weapon and is "fully deployed within 10 years" (U.S. Department of Defense 2020b, 3). We It is estimated that China has maintained a small stock of gravity bombs—possibly as many as 20—for potential emergency use of aircraft for many years, although it has only recently begun to reallocate official nuclear missions to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

In addition to gravity bombs, the National Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 2016 that China is developing two air-launched ballistic missiles for the H-6 bomber, "one of which may contain a nuclear payload" (Stewart 2016, 10). The missile designated by the United States as CH-AS-X-13 will be carried by the H-6N BADGER, another modified version of the H-6 bomber, which made its debut in the military parade in October 2019 and will appear in the Chinese people. The People's Liberation Army Air Force served. The appearance of the H-6N differs from the H-6K dual-purpose bomber in that it is equipped with a nose-mounted aerial refueling probe (Rupprecht 2019), and includes air-launched ballistic missiles or no nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missiles deemed by the US Department of Defense. Human and machine (US Department of Defense 2020a, 51). The 106th Brigade at Neixiang Air Force Base in southwestern Henan Province may be one of the first bomber units to obtain operational nuclear capabilities. Civil video footage from October 2020 seems to show that an H-6N bomber is flying with a possible new air-launched ballistic missile — possibly carrying a hypersonic gliding vehicle — just outside the Neixiang Air Force Base, which seems to be the only one in China One of the bases has an airport with an adjacent air defense station (Lee 2020a; Lee 2020c; Rupprecht and Dominguez 2020).

The air-launched ballistic missile under development was tested for the first time in December 2016 and January 2018 (Panda 2019). The US Department of Defense reported in early 2020 that "TBD [name to be determined] ALBM [air-launched ballistic missile]" is "in the development stage within 10 years" (US Department of Defense 2020b, 3). Once completed, this nuclear air-launched ballistic missile will "provide China with a viable nuclear'trinity' delivery system for the first time, dispersed in land, sea, and air forces" (US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 67).

In order to replace the H-6, China is developing a bomber with a longer range and greater capability. For several years, U.S. officials have stated that the new bomber known as the H-20 will have nuclear capabilities (Coats 2018, 7; U.S. Department of Defense 2019, 61). At the beginning of 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense described the H-20 as a "stealth" bomber, whose production will begin within 10 years (U.S. Department of Defense 2020b, 3).

From time to time, various U.S. military publications have vaguely asserted that one or more of China’s cruise missiles may have nuclear capabilities. However, we estimate that although China may have developed a warhead design that may be used for cruise missiles, it does not have any active nuclear cruise missiles in its inventory.

The Central Intelligence Agency concluded in 1995 that the Chinese test scheduled for that year "may include... the warhead test of cruise missiles" (CIA 1995). In 2013, the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command reported that the CJ-20 air-launched ground-attack cruise missile carried by the H-6K was listed as having dual capabilities (Kristensen 2013). Similarly, in 2009, the Air Force described the DH-10 (now known as DF-10) land-based cruise missile as "conventional or nuclear," but in 2017 it listed it and all other Chinese air-launched land-based cruise missiles as " Conventional "" (National Aerospace Intelligence Center, 2017, p. 37). Even so, a nuclear modernization fact sheet issued by the Pentagon in its 2018 nuclear posture assessment report claimed that China has air-launched and sea-launched nuclear cruises. Missiles (US Department of Defense 2018b), but did not specify their identities. It is possible, but unconfirmed, that the future H-20 may be equipped with nuclear cruise missiles.

This research was conducted with funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshare Foundation, and the Prospect Mountain Foundation.

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Keywords: China, DF-41, H-6, intercontinental ballistic missile, IRBM, SLBM, SSBN, nuclear weapons Subject: nuclear risk, nuclear weapons

Thanks to Kristensen and Korda for their knowledgeable work. It helps clarify the threats looming over all of us and inspires us to work harder to promote diplomacy and common sense in the abolition movement.

Christensen is the head of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington, DC. The focus of his work is... Read more

Matt Korda is a senior research assistant and project manager for the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists, where... Read more

Authors: Robert Alvarez, Joseph Mangano

Authors: Robert Rosner, Sabrina Fields

Authors: Robert Rosner, Sabrina Fields

Authors: Robert Alvarez, Joseph Mangano

Authors: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda

Authors: Leonardo Bandara, Sharon Dolev

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